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ofthe 
This is a negligence case. Mr. Henrie was severely injured while working in a dangerous 
environment, after being ordered by the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints (hereinafter "the Church") to help clean up a burned area in Pocatello. In 
addition, the Church ordered Mr. Henrie to wear grotesquely loose clothing while he was working 
in the burned area, where it was reasonably forseeable by the Church that Mr. Henrie would get hurt. 
Mr. Henrie is a lifetime member of the Church and served as the Elders Quorum President 
of his ward. On July 14, 2012, after receiving an order from his bishop to go to the burned area 
created by the Charlotte Creek fire that occurred in Pocatello on June 28, 2012, Mr. Henrie went, 
without asking any questions. Mr. Henrie believed he was doing a service at the request of the Lord. 
When Mr. Henrie lined up at the staging area the Church had set up at Century High School, he 
signed his name and listed his ward. Other members of the Church were handing out smocks with 
the "Mormon Helping Hands" and Church logo on them. When Mr. Henrie looked at the smock, 
he told the Church/Mormon Helping Hands person handing it to him that it was much too large, or, 
as Mr. Henrie characterized it, "grotesquely large" and asked for a smaller smock. The 
Church/Mormon Helping Hands member there told Mr. Henrie that that smock "was all that was 
left." The Church/Mormon Helping Hands member also told Mr. Henrie that it was mandatory for 
him to wear the smock if he wanted to participate in the cleanup-if he did not wear it, he could not 
participate. 
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as to on 
iarge he was large logs down a a branch of 
the log Mr. Henrie was throwing caught on the smock and pulled him down the hill. Mr. Henrie, 
as a result, suffered severe injuries to his right knee. 
The District Court improperly weighed the evidence in this matter and abused its discretion 
in striking Mr. Henrie's testimony as to the Church's representative's order that Mr. Henrie had to 
wear the grotesquely large smock or he could not participate, which denied Mr. Henrie his right to 
a jury trial. In addition, the District Court committed error in finding that the Church owed no duty 
to Mr. Henrie, as it was clear that it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Henrie being forced to wear 
grotesquely large clothing would cause him injuries. Also, the District Court committed reversible 
error in finding there was no special relationship between Mr. Henrie and the Church, as it was not 
disputed that Mr. Henrie was a member of the Church who was ordered to clean up, and that it was 
again, reasonably foreseeable that his being forced to wear loose clothing would cause his injuries. 
Finally, the District Court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment, as a jury, not 
the District Court, is to decide proximate cause-that is, whether, again, it was reasonably foreseeable 
the Church's requirement that Mr. Henrie wear the smock would have resulted in his being injured. 
The Course of the Proceedings Below 
On July 11, 2014, Mr. Henrie filed his complaint against the Church. R., pp. 7-10. The 
Church filed its Answer on March 9, 2015. R., pp. 11-18. The initial districtjudge assigned the 
case, Judge Nye, disqualified himself. R., pp. 19-20. Judge Naftz, after having the case reassigned 
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was 2 
The case was scheduled for trial the week ofMarch 15, 2016. R., pp. 28-33. On November 
2, 2015, Mr. Henrie disclosed his fact and expert witnesses. R., pp. 34-35. The Church disclosed 
its fact and expert witnesses on December 4, 2015. R., pp. 36-42. 
On December 16, 2015, the Church filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in 
Limine, with supporting memoranda and affidavits. R., pp. 43-110. Mr. Henrie filed his opposition 
memorandum and affidavits to the summary judgment motion and motion in limine on January 19, 
2016. R., pp. 111-203; 211-214. Mr. Henrie also filed an objection/motion to strike the Affidavit 
of Paul Rytting, a Church representative, filed in support of its summary judgment motion. R., pp. 
204-210. On January 25, 2016, the Church filed its reply memoranda in support of its motions in 
limine and summary judgment, as well as its memorandum in opposition to Mr. Henrie's 
objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's affidavit. R., pp. 215-246. On January 27, 2016, Mr. 
Henrie filed his reply memorandum in support of his objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's 
affidavit. R., pp. 247-251. 
On February 8, 2016, a hearing was held on the parties' respective motions, and the parties 
offered their respective arguments on the motions. Tr., pp. 5-28. 
After the hearing on the pending motions the parties stipulated to move the trial date to May 
24, 2016, which the District Court ordered. R., pp. 252-256. 
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Church's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Lirnine, as as Mr. Henrie's 
objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's affidavit. R., pp. 257-279. The District Court also entered 
Judgment dismissing the case on March 16, 2016. R., pp. 280-281. Thereafter, on March 29, 2016, 
Mr. Henrie filed his notice of appeal. R., pp. 282-286. 
Statement of Facts 
Since he was born, Mr. Henrie was an active member of the Church, was raised in the 
Church, and continues to be a member. R., 141 (Deposition of Bryan N. Henrie p. 34:3-21 ). A 
graduate of Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School, subsequent to his graduation, 
Mr. Henrie worked as an attorney in Pocatello from 2010 to 2014. R., p.135 (Henrie Depo., p. 11 :2-
25). Mr. Henrie was the Elder's Quorum President of the Paradise Ward in the Tyhee Stake. R., 
142 (Henrie Depo, p.37: 16-20; R., pp.211-212 (Aff. of Fred Zundel ,i,i 2-3). Fred Zundel was Mr. 
Henrie's bishop, and Kevin Loveland was the stake president. Id. 
The incident giving rise to Mr. Henrie's claims occurred on July 14, 2012. R., p. 137 (Henrie 
Depo., p. 19:22-20:8; R., p. 141 (Henrie Depo., p. 33:25-34: l ). Prior to the incident, on June 28, 
2012, a fire broke out in the Charlotte Creek area of Pocatello. Subsequent thereto, the Church, 
through its Mormon Helping Hands program, put forth a wide-scale effort, involving multiple 
stakes, to clean-up the burned area. R., 143 (Henrie Depo. p. 43:1-44:11); R., pp.144-45 (Henrie 
Depo. p. 48: 19-49:24); R., p.129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B-Video of the clean-up by the Church's 
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's Mormon Helping Hands was mvolved in the up effort on the date of the incident. 
Sometime prior to the incident, Mr. Henrie was given an assignment, handed down from a 
member of the Stake Presidency to Bishop Fred Zundel to Mr. Henrie, the Elders Quorum President. 
R., p. 141-42 (Henrie Depo.,p.36: 25-37:20); R., 144 (Henrie Depo., p.46:11-47:10); R., p. 149 
(Henrie Depo., p. 68:15-16); R., pp. 212-213(Zundel Aff., ~~5-6). Mr. Henrie characterized his 
bishop's assignment as an "order:" 
Q. 
A. 
Was it a voluntary thing, you going out and helping with the 
Helping Hands, from your perspective, or was it something your 
bishop-you were required to do, you had to do? 
Well, I mean, I'd be remiss ifl didn't say that I had some, you know, 
like good intentions in terms of like wanting to help the community 
out. But, you know, if we're being honest, I felt compelled because 
my bishop came to me and said you're in charge of this, go out 
and do it and get guys to come with you. So, I mean, especially 
being the elders quorum president and having that calling and 
assignment and having-you know, having sustained my bishop and 
my stake presidency and my other church leaders, both local and 
international, you know, the general authorities, you know, I said, 
well, this is about as compulsory as it comes in terms of church 
service. And, you know, I don't know that I would have gotten fired 
as the elders quorum president had I not done it because-I don't 
know. I don't know. But it was compulsory, as far as I was 
concerned. 
Q. And it was an inner feeling you had that you wanted to do kind 
of the right thing, I guess, and magnify your calling maybe and 
be a leader as opposed to an external order from the bishop, you 
will go; is that a fair characterization? 










Yeah. There was an external order from the bishop. 
Okay. 
It was also-I mean, I don 't-1 don't know that-I don't know that I can 
adequately explain it other than just by saying that you have this 
external order to do something and there are certain things that you're 
ordered to do that are repugnant to you, and there are other things that 
you're ordered to do that you're like, okay, that's a good thing. And 
in this case the two lined up. I was ordered to do it and I said, you 
know what, that's not a bad thing to do, helping people out. So I was 
happy that it was-you know. And I don't-I really-you know, I don't 
think that I'd ever be ordered something absolutely repugnant from 
my church leaders, but-
Right. 
-you know-
It wasn't fun. 
But this was an instance in which I was ordered to do something 
and I did complv. 
R., pp. 14 7-48 (Henrie Depo., p. 60: l 0-62: 11) [bold underscore supplied]. Being a member of the 
Church since birth, and following its teachings, Mr. Henrie further characterized his bishop's order 
or calling, as follows: 
And I was taught always as a deacon, as a teacher, as a priest, as an 
elder, I probably will as high priest, if I ever make it-I was taught in 
primary. I was taught in nursery that when somebody extends a 
calling-when your bishop extends you a calling, when your stake 
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Lord himself. 
And so to say it's like a "will you" and if you don't, it's cool, I think that 
that's-in a way, yes, like looking at it from an outside perspective. But if 
you're a member of the church and somebody asks you to fulfill a 
calling, you're going to accept it unless you've got a shaky testimony, I 
guess, or something-because I've never turned down a calling. 
R., pp. 148-49 (Henrie Depo., p. 64:21-65: 13) [ emphasis supplied]. Mr. Henrie unequivocally 




Okay. So was this an order just to you as the president of the 
quorum or was it to you and then for you to order the people of 
the quorum to come? 
Well, if you break it down what he said, he said, President Henrie, 
I need you to go-you need to go participate in this cleanup and 
get other people to come with you, as many people as vou can 
muster. So he ordered me to go and he ordered me to get other 
people, as many as I could get. He never-he never came into the 
elders quorum and, to my knowledge, he never went into the high 
priests. He passed it off to me. He never went in and said, hey, I 
need every single one of you guys to come in. He gave it to me. He 
delegated that responsibility to me, but I don't think that he-I don't 
think that he-I don't think he-well, he didn't. He didn't say, but if 
you don't want to go, you can delegate that responsibility to 
somebody else. He gave it to me. 
R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo., p 65: 14-66:8) [bold underscore supplied]. Mr. Henrie also never said no 
to his bishop's requests. R., p. 150 (Henrie Depo., p. 69:5-12). 
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the Ward including Eider's Quorum President, serve the Church to 
accomplish the Church's assignments: 
4. The Ward Council 
4.1 Councils in the Church 
The Lord's Church is governed through councils at the general, area, stake, 
and ward levels. These councils are fundamental to the order of the 
Church. 
Under the keys of priesthood leadership at each level, leaders counsel 
together for the benefit of individuals and families. Council members also 
plan the work of the Church pertaining to their assignments. Effective 
councils invite full expression from council members and unify their efforts 
in responding to individual, family, and organizational needs. 
R., p. 203 [ emphasis supplied]. 
Sometime before 8:30 on the morning of July 14, 2012, Mr. Henrie went to Century High 
School, where the Church set up a staging area to have members sign up. R., p. 144-45 (Henrie 
Depo., p. 48: 19-49:3) R., p. l 60(Henrie Depo. p. 110: 16-23). There were about 500 church 
members there, and they were wearing smocks with the Mormon Helping Hands logo and the 
Church's name on them. R., p. 145 (Henrie Depo. p. 49:4-24); R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B). 
There were tables set up, and Mr. Henrie lined up to sign his name and ward. R., p. 152 (Henrie 
Depo. p. 77:3-79: 11 ). Mr. Henrie testified that there were sisters giving directions on where to and 
what to do. R., p. 152 (Henrie Depo, p. 79: 12-19). The Church videotaped the tables and sisters 
handing out smocks and telling people where to go. R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B-Video of the 
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Church's Mormon Helping Hands video. As is seen on the video, at 48-52 seconds into the video, 
as well as at 1 :06-1: 13 minutes into the video, there are sisters handing out smocks and telling 
people where to go. Id. Exh. B. 
Mr. Henrie did not remember signing any forms or releases or waivers. R., p. 152 (Henrie 
Depo. p. 80:22-81 :5). Smocks were handed out at the tables, and Mr. Henrie was handed a smock 
with the Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., p. 153 (Henrie Depo. p. 81:6-
82:25); R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 86: 18-20). When Mr. Henrie looked at the smock, he was 
concerned as it was "grotesquely large." R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 88: 13-20). Mr. Henrie testified 
that while he said it was too big, the Mormon Helping Hands person told him he had to wear it or 
he could not participate. R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 86:2-22). Mr. Henrie testified more 
specifically, as follows: 
Q. Okay. And then did she say anything about it? 
A. Whoever it was-I remember getting it. It was handed to me and I 
remember saying this is really big. And they said, well, it's all 
we've got left, because apparently, they'd been picked clean-well, 
not-I don't know how clean because, you know, I can't vouch for 
how many were left. But at that point thev said this is all we've 
got left. 
Q. Okay. And it looked big to you, too big for you, is that what 
you're saying? 
A. It looked really big. And, I mean, I don't know what their standard 
was, but, I mean, to me it seemed-it could have been a lot tighter 
fit-like a lot tighter fitting. 
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it on? 
A. Yeah. I tried it on. 
Q. And you asked for a smaller size, but you were told there's none 








I tend to think that it was "this is all we've got left." 
Are you fuzzy on that? Is that the gist of it or-
The gist of it is that they didn't have a smaller size and that's all that 
was left. 
But that's all that was left. So I infer from that that there were 
other sizes-smaller sizes previously, but they'd ran out; is that 
what-
That's what I was led to believe. 
By what she said? 
By what the person who handed it to me said, yes. 
*** 
Q. And was there any discussion about whether you had to wear it 
or should wear it or-
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. What was that discussion? 
A. I was told that I had to wear it to participate in the cleanup. It 
was required. 
*** 
Q. -the person who may have been a female, she's the one who told 
you that it's required that you don the vest--
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s correct. me that. 
Q. -smock? Did you have a concern about it being too large at the time? 
A. Well, yeah. I said it's pretty big. I would like a smaller one so it 
fits better. And that's-and then that's when they repeated it's all 
we've got. So I said all right. Because, you know, to participate, 
you have to wear it. 
R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., p. 83: 1-84: 8; 86:2-7; 87: 10-16)[bold and underscore supplied]. Mr. 
Henrie was concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that "wearing something that's 
too large-a garment that's too large for you is not smart when you're working in industrial type 
settings." R., p. 155 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). As a result of being told he had to wear the smock 
or he could not participate, Mr. Henrie felt stuck. Mr. Henrie testified: 
Because she had already said thev're required for the project, they're 
required for working up there and this is all we've got, so I was stuck. 
I was at the front of the line and there are people behind me and they said this 
is all you've got and if you're going to work on the project, you've got to 
wear it. So, I mean, I was stuck. I didn't-I mean, I guess an ideal 
circumstance, everything-you know, with plenty of other smocks available, 
I would have said, yeah, I've got a safety concern, give me another one, but 
I had already expressed my concern that it was too big and she said this 
is all we've got and that you need it to work on the project, and so I 
guess I just said all right. This is what I've got. I'm just going to have 
to work with it. I can see your point, but I just-I was stuck. I felt stuck. 
R., p. 156 (Henrie Depo., p.96:5-22) [emphasis supplied]. 
Mr. Henrie then proceeded to work on the project, as he was "ordered to go up and do a 
service project, which involved rolling trees down a hill .... " R.,p. 157 (Henrie Depo., p. 100: 10-
12). The work put him "directly in harm's way," ... as he "could have gotten crushed." R., p. 157 
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that was too large for him, and that it was inherently dangerous, where it could catch on the tree limb 
and pull him down the hill. R., p. 165 (Henrie Depo., p.131: 18-132:24). 
After donning the smock, Mr. Henrie went to work, working on a hill, rolling and throwing 
two foot long, approximately 70 pound sectioned logs. When he picked up a log, a branch caught 
the smock he was wearing and pulled him down the hill with it. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie Depo., p. 
112:19-114:20); R., pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117: 17); R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie Depo., p. 
122:4-9; 125:17-127:9). Mr. Henrie injured his right knee and had to have surgery. R., p. 169-70 
(Henrie Depo.,p. 146:4-23; 149:13-150:3). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in the granting the Church's Motion in Limine as 
to the Church's agent's statement that Mr. Henrie was required to wear the smock to participate, 
where the Church's statement was an admission of a party opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 80l(d)(2), as the Church's agent admitted that the smock Mr. Henrie wore at the time of 
the incident giving rise to his claims was mandatory; and that the smock that was given to Mr. 
Henrie was the only size that the Church had left; 
2. Whether the District Court committed error in granting the Church's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact the Church did 
not owe Mr. Henrie any duty, when it was reasonably anticipated or foreseeable that Mr. Henrie 
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working in a dangerous environment; 
3. Whether the District Court committed error in granting summary judgment to the 
Church in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that no special relationship 
between Mr. Henrie, and in forcing him to wear the smock in the clean up efforts in which the 
Church compelled Appellant to work; 
4. Whether the District Court committed error in granting summary judgment by 
concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause between Mr. Henrie's 
injury and the Church's act of forcing him to wear a smock while working in a reasonably 
foreseeable dangerous situation. 
5. Whether Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law."' Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 
918 P.2d 583, 587 (I 996)(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 ldaho 745,890 
P.2d 331 (1995). In making this determination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor 
of the party opposing the motion and draw al1 reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's 
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"has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the 
facts, and a genuine issue of fact is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 
Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 288, 291-292 (Ct. App. 1992)(internal citations omitted). However, 
"[i]f the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the 
absence of genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving 
party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." Smith, supra, 
128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (citing Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530 
887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994)). Additionally, based on the evidence, if reasonable persons could 
reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied. City 
ofChubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,200,899 P.2d41 l, 413 (1995)(citation omitted), 
citing Harris v. Department of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 
(1992)). 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE AND 
FAILED TO GIVE MR. HENRIE ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM 
THE RECORD, THEREBY MISAPPLYING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STANDARD. 
The rules applying to a court's determination of summary judgment are as follows: 
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary 
judgment, all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party. The burden of proving the absence of a material fact 
rests at all times upon the moving party. This burden is onerous because 
even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material 
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record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because 
all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement 
that all reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for 
summary judgment the opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment, 
a motion for summary judgment should be granted with caution. 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769-70, 820 P.2d 360, 364-65(1991 )[internal citations 
omitted][ emphasis added]. Furthermore, it is well-established that on summary judgment, a trial 
court is not allowed to weigh the evidence and is to resolve all doubts against the moving party: 
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must 
determine if there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of 
facts. On such a motion it is not the function of the trial court to weigh 
the evidence or to determine those issues. Moreover, all doubts must be 
resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment. 
Merrill v. Duffy Reed Cons tr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960)[ emphasis added]. 
See also, American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1983) ("A 
trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues."); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724,730,552 P.2d 776, 
782 (1976)(citing, Merrill, supra); ,Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 993 P.2d 609, 612 
(2000)("The district court may not weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues.")). 
Additionally, "[a] motion for summary judgment should be denied if the pleadings, admissions, 
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supra, 82 Idaho at 41 353 at 
1. The District Court improperly weighed the evidence and credibility of Mr. 
Henrie in excluding his testimony that a Church agent told him he had to wear 
the grotesquely large smock or he could not participate. 
It is well-settled that a trial court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or assess the 
credibility of witnesses on summary judgment. The District Court violated this rule by excluding 
Mr. Henrie's testimony that a Church agent told Mr. Henrie that he had to wear the oversized smock, 
or he could not participate in the clean-up efforts the Church had ordered him to do. R., p. 266. In 
reaching its decision, the District Court weighed the evidence. Here, there is no question the Church 
held the people handing out smocks and signing in other members as its agents. Also, Mr. Henrie 
testified that there were "sisters" at the tables, giving directions on where to go and what to do. R., 
152 (Henrie Depo., p. 79: 12-19). Smocks were handed out at the tables the Church set up, and Mr. 
Henrie was handed a smock with the Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., 153 
(Henrie Depo., p. 81 :6-82:25); R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B (Mormon Helping Hands Video)). 
Mr. Henrie's testimony is corroborated by the Church's Mormon Helping Hands video. As is seen 
on the Mormon Helping Hands video, at 48-52 seconds into the video, as well as at 1 :06-1: 13 
minutes into the video, there are sisters handing out smocks, and telling people where to go. 
Id. Exh. B. 
Further, Mr. Henrie's deposition testimony the smock was too big, which the District Court 
ignored in weighing the evidence, is as follows: 
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A. Whoever it was-I remember getting it. It was handed to me and I 
remember saying this is really big. And thev said, well, it's all 
we've got left, because apparently, they'd been picked clean-well, 
not-I don't know how clean because, you know, I can't vouch for 
how many were left. But at that point thev said this is all we've 
got left. 
Q. Okay. And it looked big to you, too big for you, is that what 
you're saying? 
A. It looked really big. And, I mean, I don't know what their standard 
was, but, I mean, to me it seemed-it could have been a lot tighter 
fit-like a lot tighter fitting. 
Q. So did you put it on? 
A. Yeah. l tried it on. 
Q. And you asked for a smaller size, but you were told there's none 
left; is that the phrase? 
A. I tend to think that it was "this is all we've got left." 
Q. Are you fuzzy on that? Is that the gist of it or-
A. The gist of it is that they didn't have a smaller size and that's all that 
was left. 
Q. But that's all that was left. So I infer from that that there were 





That's what I was led to believe. 
By what she said? 
By what the person who handed it to me said, yes. 
*** 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 17 
was any to wear it 
or should wear it or-
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. ,vhat was that discussion? 
A. I was told that I had to wear it to participate in the cleanup. It 
was required. 
*** 
Q. -the person who may have been a female, she's the one who told 
you that it's required that you don the vest--
A. That's correct. She told me that. 
Q. -smock? Did you have a concern about it being too large at the time? 
A. Well, yeah. I said it's pretty big. I would like a smaller one so it 
fits better. And that's-and then that's when they repeated it's all 
we've got. So I said right. Because, you know, to participate, you 
have to wear it. 
R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., p. 83: 1-84: 8; 86:2-7; 87: 10-16)[ emphasis supplied]. Mr. Henrie was 
concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that "wearing something that's too large-a 
garment that's too large for you is not sma1i when you're working in industrial type settings." R., 
155 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). As a result of being told he had to wear the smock or he could not 
participate, Mr. Henrie felt stuck; 
Because she had already said they're required for the project, they're 
required for working up there and this is all we've got, so I was stuck. 
I was at the front of the line and there are people behind me and they said 
this is all you've got and if you're going to work on the project, you've 
got to wear it. So, I mean, I was stuck. I didn't-I mean, I guess an ideal 
circumstance, everything-you know, with plenty of other smocks available, 
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I would I a concern, me one, 
I had alreadv expressed rnv concern that it was too big and she said this 
is all we've got and that you need it to work on the project, and so I 
guess I just said all right. This is what I've got. I'm just going to have 
to work with it. I can see vour point, but I just-I was stuck. I felt stuck. 
R., p. 156 (Henrie Depo., p.96:5-22) [ emphasis supplied]. 
The Church's agent's/Mormon Helping Hands person's statement is corroborative evidence 
and admissible, especially where there is independent evidence, here, the Mormon Helping Hands 
video, showing everyone was wearing the Church's smock. In addition, the District Court further 
weighed the evidence when it ignored the undisputed evidence that the Church was the only entity 
involved in the clean-up. Further, the District Court ignored the video Mr. Henrie placed into the 
record showing the "Mormon Helping Hands" smocks and people wearing them, which was created 
and sponsored by the Church. The District Court concluded there was no evidence to establish the 
person handing out the smocks was with the Church and "Mormon Helping Hands." R., pp. 264-
266 Again, Mr. Henrie put in the record the Mormon Helping Hands video, showing that the 
Church was organizing the clean-up. In addition, that video proved Mr. Henrie's testimony that 
everyone was required to wear the smock, as it shows the participants wearing the "Mormon 
Helping Hands" smocks. The District Court cherry-picked Mr. Henrie's testimony, thereby 
weighing it, in violation of the summary judgment standard prohibiting the District Court from 
weighing the evidence. As a result, the Court should reverse the District Court's decision and 
remand the matter for further proceedings. 
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The District Court did not give the inference from Mr. Henrie's testimony that it was the 
Church's agent, and no one else's agent, that told him he had to wear the grotesquely large smock 
or he could not participate. Again, the Church did not place any evidence in the record that there 
were other entities involved in the clean-up, or that other agents, besides agents of and for the 
Church, that were handing out yellow "Mormon Helping Hands" smocks. Again, as Mr. Henrie 
testified, there were "sisters" handing out the smocks. R., 152 (Henrie Depo., p. 79: 12-19). This 
is, again corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video, with people all wearing the smock 
the Church required them to wear to work in the clean-up. R., p. 129, Exh. B., at 48-52 seconds 
into the video, as well as at 1:06-1:13 minutes into the video. Clearly, the District Court did not 
give Mr. Henrie the inference that it was the Church, through its agent handing out the Mormon 
Helping Hands smocks, that told Mr. Henrie he had to wear the smock or he could not participate. 
Further, Mr. Henrie's testimony, along with the Mormon Helping Hands video, sufficiently 
establishes the Church required Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could not participate. At the 
very least, a reasonable inference from Mr. Henrie's testimony and the Mormon Helping Hands 
video is that the person handing out the smocks and te11ing Mr. Henrie that he had to wear it or he 
could not participate, was an agent of the Church, which is sufficient to give to a jury to decide. 1 
1The Church clearly used the video for public relations and propaganda, but distances 
itself from the video for any responsibility for its actions. This double standard should not be 
rewarded. 
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3. The Church never disputed that it was the only entity engaged in the clean-up 
effort. 
As the moving party, the Church had the burden of establishing that some other entity was 
involved in the clean-up effort. However, the record is not disputed that the Church, and the 
Mormon Helping Hands, which is also the Church, was the only entity involved in the clean-up 
effort. The Church never disputed this fact, nor did it provide any evidence to the contrary, which 
was its burden as the moving party on summary judgment. The District Court ignored this 
undisputed fact, which violates the summary judgment standard. As a result, this Court should 
reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING MR. 
HENRIE'S TESTIMONY THAT THE CHURCH'S AGENT TOLD HIM HE 
WAS REQUIRED TO WEAR THE SMOCK OR HE COULD NOT 
PARTICIPATE. 
On summary judgment, the admissibility of evidence is based on an abuse of discretion 
standard. Nield v. Pocatello Health Serv., Inc., 156 Idaho 802,810,332 P.3d 714, 722 (2014). On 
appellate review, this Court asks: ( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421,224 P.3d 485, 
488 (2009). However, the trial court's discretion does not entitle it to alter or disregard specific 
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or to 
courts do not have "broad discretion." In that regard, this held: 
In State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671,674, 701 P.2d 291,294 (Ct.App.1985), 
Judge Burnett filed a special concurrence in which he challenged statements 
by this Court that trial courts have "broad discretion" over evidentiary 
rulings. Judge Burnett stated that: 
The law of evidence is structured by rules, forged by centuries of 
experience and continually tested against evolving notions of fairness and 
truth-seeking. Our Supreme Court recently has adopted a detailed and 
painstakingly drafted formulation of such rules. See Idaho Rules of Evidence 
(effective July 1, 1985). These rules are not mere precatory guides to 
discretion; they are standards controlling the outcome of evidentiary 
questions. A trial judge possesses no "discretionary" authority to alter 
or to disregard specific standards-particularly in criminal trials, where 
these standards impart real meaning to an accused's right to a fair trial. 
Discretion is properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it. 
We have recognized and cited Judge Burnett's analysis approvingly. State v. 
Smith, 117 Idaho225,234, 786P.2d 1127, 1136(1990)(citingMaylett, 108 
Idaho at 674, 70 l P.2d at 294 (Burnett, J., specially concurring) ("Discretion 
is properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it.")). 
Watkins, supra, 148 Idaho at 420-21, 224 P.3d at 487-88 [bold emphasis supplied]. In addition, this 
Court in Watkins further held that a trial court's discretion is only broad where it is the fact finder 
and bounded by the rules and principles of law: 
We have emphasized that the trial court's discretion is only broad when 
it acts as a fact finder: With respect to the admission of evidence, the 
trial court has broad discretion and its judgment in the fact finding role 
will only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of 
discretion. Further, we have refined our statement that a trial court has 
discretion over evidentiary rulings by noting that nevertheless, questions of 
relevancy are reviewed de novo. In short, our previous decisions reflect our 
understanding that application of the rules of evidence require trial courts to 
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answer 1s 
"discretion respect to our standard 
rulings, we mean judicial discretion, i.e., the discretionary action of a 
judge or court ... bounded by the rules and principles of law, and not 
arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence ofajudicial 
whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by 
Jaw, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the 
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course 
prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that 
of the law. Our commonly used standard for determining whether a trial 
court abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling incorporates 
this meaning of judicial discretion. 
Watkins, 148 Idaho at 421, 224 P.3d at 488 [internal citations omitted][italics in original][bold 
emphasis supplied]. In Watkins, this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion, finding that 
the trial comi incorrectly decided an issue related to hearsay, and remanded the case for a new trial. 
Id., 148 Idaho at 423-427, 224 P.3d at 490-494. 
In addition, where an incorrect ruling regarding evidence occurs, relief is granted where the 
error affects a substantial right of the one of the parties. Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 
Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). In this matter, Mr. Henrie certainly has a substantial 
right-that is, the right to a trial by jury, which he requested. R., 10. The Constitution of the United 
States, Amendment VII, and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, § 7 both grant the 
parties to a civil suit the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Further, pursuant to Article I,§ 7, the 
right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate." Additionally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a), 
provides the parties to a civil suit the right to a jury trial. 
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agent told him had to wear the crr,,1-o,,n 
participate in the Church's clean up effort. 
The District Court abused its discretion, and wrongfully decided that the Church's agent's 
statement to Mr. Henrie, that if he wanted to participate in the project, he would have to wear the 
oversized, "grotesquely large" Mormon Helping Hands smock, was hearsay. To the contrary, the 
Church's agent's statements that Mr. Henrie had to wear the oversized smock was an admission of 
a party opponent, and not hearsay. As I.R.E 80 I provides: 
d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
*** 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested 
an adoption or beliefin its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
a party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment of the servant or agent, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
[ emphasis supplied]. A statement by a party opponent, and a statement of an agent of a party 
opponent, is not hearsay. McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 602, 790 P.2d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 
1990); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, 148 Idaho 89,107,218 P.3d 1150, 1168 (2009). As the 
moving party on summary judgment, the Church had the burden of showing that there were other 
religious organizations or entities involved in the clean up and that those agents were handing out 
Mormon Helping Hands smocks. The Church posited no evidence establishing that the person who 
told Mr. Henrie he had to wear the smock or he could not participate was not its agent who required 
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wear no 
affidavit stating that it and the Mormon Helping Hands were not the only entities at the marshaling 
area, nor did it posit any evidence showing that other entities were handing out the Monnon Helping 
Hands smocks. What the record does show, is that the Church's members who were at the project, 
were all wearing the Mormon Helping Hands smocks. R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B ( Mormon 
Helping Hands Video). 
In addition, the Church held its Mormon Helping Hands people out as persons with apparent 
authority to act at its agent. In Idaho, it has long been settled that apparent authority exists "when 
a principal voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, 
conversant with the business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in believing 
that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clarkv. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 
278, 280 (1972); Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing, Clark, 
supra). Apparent authority is sufficient to bind a principal to a contract entered into by an agent 
with a third party, as long as the agent acted within the course and scope of authority delegated by 
the principal. Clark, supra, 95 Idaho, at 11-12, 50 I P.2d at 279-80; Bailey, supra, 109 Idaho at 498, 
708 P.2d at 903. In addition, the issue of apparent authority is a question for the jury to decide. 
Clark, 95 Idaho at 12,501 P.2d at 280; Bailey, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903. Finally, "where 
the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations [of the alleged 
agent] as corroborative evidence are admissible." Clark, supra, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280 
(citations omitted)(emphasis supplied)). 
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Here, there is no question the Church held its Mormon Helping Hands people handing out 
smocks and signing other members as agents. Mr. Henrie that there were "sisters" 
at the tables, giving directions on where to go and what to do. R., P. 152 (Henrie Depo., Id., p. 
79:12-19). Smocks were handed out at the tables, and Mr. Henrie was handed a smock with the 
Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., p. 153 (Henrie Depo., p. 81 :6-82:25); R., 
p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B ( Mormon Helping Hands Video). Under Clark, supra, the Mormon 
Helping Hands person's statement is corroborative evidence and admissible, especially where there 
is independent evidence, here, the Mormon Helping Hands video, showing everyone was wearing 
the Church's smock. Further, this sufficiently establishes a fact, and therefore a reasonable inference 
to which Mr. Henrie is entitled, that the person who handed him the smock and told him he had to 
wear it or he could not participate was an agent of the Church. Such evidence is not hearsay; it is 
an admission of a party opponent, and the District Court erred in granting summary judgment when 
faced with such evidence. Furthermore, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, as 
it is an issue of fact for the jury to decide as to the agency relationship between the person making 
the statement and the Church. 
Despite this, again, the District Court wrongfully chose to weigh the evidence to conclude 
that Mr. Henrie's statements were hearsay.2 The District Court concluded that "the record is utterly 
devoid of any evidence of any agency relationship between the unidentifiable person handing the 
2The District Court was also incorrect in its analysis of hearsay under I.R.E. 80I(d)(2). 
The statements are not hearsay, as the statements are an admission of a party opponent, which, 
by definition, is not hearsay. 
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and discounted the fact Henrie's statements the s agent told to wear 
the smock were corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video, which showed every person 
involved in the clean up wearing the Mormon Helping Hands smock. Clearly, the District Court 
wrongfully decided that Mr. Henrie's testimony was hearsay, and wrongfully granted summary 
judgment. The District Court's evidentiary error is a basis for this Court to reverse the ruling and 
remand for further proceedings, as the District Court's decision denied Mr. Henrie his substantial 
and constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. 
C. AS THE CHURCH O\VED MR. HENRIE A DUTY, AND BREACHED ITS 
DUTY, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
l. Relevant law. 
a. General duty and foreseeability. 
In an action for negligence, the elements are a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a ce1iain standard of conduct; a breach of that duty; a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and actual loss or damages. Coghlan 
v. Beta Theat Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). Whether a duty exists 
is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14, 137 P.3d 397, 401 (2006). However, as this Court held in Alegria v. 
Payonk, IOI Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980): 
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conclusions to be drawn, or where different conclusions might reasonably be 
reached by different minds, the question of negligence ... and proximate 
cause is one of fact to be submitted to the jury and not a question of law 
for the court; if, upon all the facts and circumstances, there is a 
reasonable chance or likelihood of the conclusions of reasonable men 
differing, the question is one for the jury. 
Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619-20, 619 P.2d at 137-38 [internal quotations and citation omitted][bold 
emphasis supplied]. 
Additionally, this Court in Alegria recognized that every person owes a duty to use 
reasonable and ordinary care to another person: 
[O]ne owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to 
avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be 
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result 
in such injury ... . Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary 
care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in 
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as 
to avoid such injury. In determining whether such duty has been breached by 
the allegedly negligent party, his conduct is measured against that of an 
ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and conditions 
then existing. 
Alegria, I 01 Idaho at 619,619 P.2d at 137 [internal quotations and citations omitted][bold emphasis 
supplied]. See also, Sharp v. WH. Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990) 
("E]ach person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of hann to others."). 
In addition, this Court has also identified additional factors to detern1ine whether a duty arises: 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
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duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, 
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311 [internal citations omitted]. 
Clearly, then, a duty is owed where it could be reasonably anticipated or forseen that a 
failure to use such care might result in such injury. This Court in Sharp explained the concept of 
duty and forseeability, as follows: 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure 
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and 
to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury. 
The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the 
danger or hazard connected with the activity. Whether the duty attaches 
is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the 
risk. Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the 
circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result or harm is great, 
but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability 
is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the 
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of 
foreseeability may be required. Thus, foreseeability is not to be 
measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes 
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a 
reasonably prudent person would take such into account in guiding 
reasonable conduct. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [internal quotations and citations omitted] [bold 
emphasis supplied]. In addition, the Court in Sharp, in rejecting the "prior similar incidents" 
argument, held that "only the general risk ofhann need be foreseen, not the specific mechanism of 
injury": 
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that prior similar incidents of criminal activity had occurred in the building 
or in its vicinity. However, the "prior similar incidents" rule was rejected 
recently by a leading case upon which the trial court purported to rely to the 
contrary. 
*** 
The solid and growing national trend has been toward the rejection of the 
"prior similar incidents" rule. 
*** 
Reduced to its essence, the "prior similar incidents" requirement translates 
into the familiar but fallacious saying in negligence law that every dog gets 
one free bite before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to 
control the dog. That license which is refused to a dog's owner should be 
withheld from a building's owner and the owner's agents as well. There is no 
"one free rape" rule in Idaho. The "prior similar incidents" requirement 
is not only too demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence law 
principle that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the 
specific mechanism of injury. Such a requirement would remove far too 
many issues from the jury's consideration. Foreseeability is ordinarily 
a question of fact. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d at 510 [ emphasis supplied][intemal citations omitted]. See also, 
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143, 148-49 (1996)( citing, Sharp). As held in Sharp, 
foreseeability is a question for the trier of fact. Additionally, the maxim that where the degree of 
harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, results in only showing a relatively low degree of 
foreseeability. 
b. Duty arising due to a special relationship. 
Further, a duty to act arises where a special relationship exists. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 
Idaho 244, 985 P .2d 669 (1999). "[A] special relationship exists between the actor and the other 
which gives the other a right to protection." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. Moreover, 
as this Court held in Rees, supra: 
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considerations of policy 
is entitled to protection. 
Id., 143 Idaho at 15, 137 P.3d at 402 [internal citation omitted]. 
c. Proximate cause. 
It is well-settled that the "question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost always for 
the jury." Cramerv. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,875,204 P.3d 508,515 (2009). "The legal responsibility 
element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the defendant's negligent act the 
plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's 
conduct." Doe Iv. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1041, 895 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Ct. App. 
1995). Furthermore, proximate cause can be shown from a "chain of circumstances from which the 
ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable." Nield v. Pocatello 
Health Serv. Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 812-13, 332 P.3d 714, 725-26 (2014). 
2. Whether it was reasonably forseeable that Mr. Henrie would be injured when 
the Church ordered him to work in the clean up effort and forced him to wear 
the grotesquely large smock is a jury question. 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment, as it is indeed a jury question to the 
issue of foreseeability of whether Mr. Henrie could have been injured. Idaho law requires a showing 
that the risk of harm was foreseeable, not the mechanism of injury. Sharp, supra. Certainly, the risk 
of injury in forcing Mr. Henrie to wear a dangerously, "grotesquely large" smock, solely for the 
reason that the Church could show the community it performs services for the community, was high, 
as illustrated by the fact that it got caught on a log and sent Mr. Henrie tumbling down a hill. This 
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It is that was a dangerous man 
industrial setting, where loose clothing has the increased potential to cause severe injuries or death. 
Mr. Henrie testified that he was concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that 
"wearing something that's too large-a garment that's too large for you is not smart when you're 
working in industrial type settings." R., p. 15 5 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). Mr. Henrie also feltthat 
the Church forced him in to wearing a large smock was inherently dangerous, where it could catch 
on a tree limb and pull him down the hill. R., p. 165 (Henrie Depo., p.131: 18-132:24). Mr. Henrie's 
concerns rang true, obviously, as when he picked up a log, a branch caught the smock he was 
wearing and pulled him down the hill with it. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie Depo., p. 112: 19-114:20; R., 
pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117:17; R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie Depo., p. 122:4-9; 125:17-
127:9). 
Furthermore, the District Court usurped the jury's function in concluding that it was not 
reasonably expected that loose clothing could become entangled and cause Mr. Henrie to tumble 
down the hill. R., p. 273. The District Court's conclusion was much too narrow, and ignored the 
"cardinal negligence law principle that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the 
specific mechanism of injury." Sha1p, 118 Idaho at 301,796 P.2d at 510. It is the inherent risk of 
injury of working on a hillside, throwing large logs down a hill, and the risk of harm associated with 
that, not specifically whether it was foreseeable that the smock could have caused the injury, that 
is relevant, although, again, wearing loose clothing, too, is reasonably foreseeable as creating a risk 
or har111. 
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to determine whether a duty arises, citing that it would "kill the Helping Hands organization" if Mr. 
Henrie's claim were allowed to go forward. 3 R., p. 273. The District Court ignored other factors 
to determine foreseeability, as this Court listed in Sharp: 
Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not 
difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, 
where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such 
injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Thus, 
foreseeability is not to be measured by just what is more probable than 
not, but also includes whatever result is likely enough in the setting of 
modern life that a reasonably prudent person would take such into 
account in guiding reasonable conduct. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [emphasis added]. It beggars belief that the 
Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for damages, would "kill" any future efforts by the Church, since 
it is well-known that the Church is a multi-billion dollar religious/charitable organization.4 
3The District Court's reasoning that it would "kill the Helping Hands organization" is not 
only improper in law, but also in scripture. See Matthew 6: l (Latter Day Saint Version): "Take 
heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward 
of your Father which is in heaven." [ emphasis supplied]. 
4Additionally, the District Court improperly sided with the Church, with the apparent 
belief that because the Church is a charitable entity, it should not be liable to Mr. Henrie for 
damages. This is improper, given this Court's holding in Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the 
Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). In Steed, this Court held 
that: "This Court has previously rejected the arguments that it should immunize charitable 
organizations from liability in tort for public policy reasons. Although the Wheat opinion 
left open the possibility that a nonpaying recipient of the charitable organization's services 
could be held to have impliedly waived the right to recover damages resulting from the 
negligence of the organization's employees, we also reject that rationale. Subject to certain 
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foreseeability of harm to Mr. Henrie; the closeness of connection between the Church's act of 
forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the grotesquely large and loose smock; moral blame attached to the 
Church's conduct; and the policy of preventing future harm. The District Court did not engage in 
analyzing these other pertinent factors. Rather, it placed its entire emphasis on whether it would 
"kill" the Church's program, and based its decision solely on that factor. In doing this, the District 
Court clearly committed reversible enor. It is for the jury, not the District Court, to decide whether 
the degree of harm was great, and preventing it was not difficult, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr. 
Henrie to wear the grotesquely large smock would have prevented his injuries. As a result, Mr. 
Henrie is entitled to an order reversing the grant of summary judgment and remanding the case back 
for further proceedings. 
3. A special relationship existed between the Church and Mr. Henrie. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Henrie was the Elders Quorum president of his ward, and that 
his bishop, Fred Zundel, gave him an assignment to clean up the burned area. R., p. 141-42 (Henrie 
Depo.,p.36: 25-37:20); R., 144 (Henrie Depo., p.46: 11-47: 10); R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo., p. 68: 15-
16); R., pp. 212-213(Zundel Aff., ,i,i 5-6). Again, Mr. Henrie characterized his bishop's assignment 
exceptions, parties to a transaction may agree by contract to limit liability or waive rights and 
remedies. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,695 P.2d 361 (1984). It would be improper for 
the Court to step in and imply a waiver that the parties did not agree to. Id., 144 Idaho at 856, 
172 P.3d at 1131 [bold emphasis supplied]. 
As to waiver, it is not disputed that Mr. Henrie did not sign any waiver or release. R., 
152-53 (Henrie Depo., p. 80:22-81 :5). 
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48 (Henrie Depo., p. 60: 10-63: 15). Mr. Henrie unequivocally testified that he was ordered by his 
bishop to go with Mormon Helping Hands to clean up the burned area. R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo., 
p 65:14-66:8). Mr. Henrie also never said no to his bishop's requests. R., p. 150 (Henrie Depo., p. 
69:5-12). Again, Mr. Henrie's testimony is copasetic with the Church's organizational structure, 
in that the members of the Ward Council, including the Elders Quorum President, serve in the 
Church to accomplish the Church's assignments and meet the Church's organizational needs. R., 
p. 203. Clearly, there was a special relationship between Mr. Henrie and the Church. 
The District Court, again, weighing the evidence, simply found that the Church was only a 
community organizer bringing together individual volunteers. R., p. 274. The District Court again 
ignored the fact that the Church, along with Church members, was the only entity at the event and 
the only entity performing the clean-up. In addition, the District Court ignored the fact that Mr. 
Henrie was an Elders Quorum President, ordered by his bishop, to go assist in the clean-up effort 
that only the Church was performing. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that wearing large 
clothing, and the Church forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the loose and grotesquely large clothing in a 
burned out area throwing large logs, would result in the injuries he suffered. That reasonably 
foreseeable risk could have been easily prevented, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr. Henrie to wear 
the grotesquely large smock. Further, the Church had the right to control Mr. Henrie's conduct. 
Again, Mr. Henrie was ordered by the Church to go to the burned out area, and oversaw the clean 
up effort. All of these issues were for the jury to decide, not the District Court. 
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The issue of proximate cause is a jury question. Here, it is also an issue of fact as to whether 
the risk of harm the Church forced Mr. Henrie to work in was reasonably foreseeable. Whether Mr. 
Henrie's bishop ordered him to go to the clean-up is a question of fact also. Mr. Henrie's bishop 
acknowledged he gave Mr. Henrie an assignment. Mr. Henrie, being a life-long member of the 
Church, who was taught that when you are requested or given an assignment, you do it, because the 
Church considers it as a request from the Lord. Thus, the jury, not the District Court, is to decide 
how a reasonable member would view an assignment from his bishop and whether Mr. Henrie 
rightfully took it as an order. This "order," when combined with the Church's agent's statementthat 
you wear the Mormon Helping Hands smock or you cannot fulfill the Lord's request, and, thereafter, 
putting on the grotesquely oversized smock, establish an issue of fact as to proximate cause. In other 
words, this chain of circumstances-an order from your bishop, a directive from the Church to wear 
the smock, grotesquely large as it is, and it getting caught on a log causing Mr. Henrie to fall, is a 
determination for the jury. 
In addition, the District Court erred in finding there was no evidence whether wearing the 
smock created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm, or that there was no evidence the smock 
was actually too large for him. R., p. 277. Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, Mr. Henrie 
testified, without objection by the Church, that the smock was "grotesquely large." R. p. 154 
(Henrie Depo., p. 88: 13-20). Further, the District Court struck the Church's agent's affidavit who 
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Decision Order). the 
testimony the smock was too large and loose fitting. The record also shows that Mr. Henrie's smock 
got caught on a log and caused him to fall, resulting in his knee injuries. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie 
Depo., p. 112:19-114:20; R., pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117:17; R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie 
Depo.,p.122:4-9; 125:17-127:9);R.,p.169-70(HenrieDepo.,p.146:4-23; 149:13-150:3). Thus, 
there is sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Henrie's injuries were reasonably foreseeable orresulted 
as a natural, probable consequence from the Church forcing him to wear loose clothing in a burned 
area while throwing logs. Every member of the Church was required to wear those smocks, as 
evidenced by the Mormon Helping Hands video. As a result, this Court must reverse the District 
Court's decision granting summary judgment and remand the case back for further proceedings. 
D. MR. HENRIE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney's 
fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. Mr. Henrie 
submits that the Church was clearly not entitled to summary judgment, and that the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment was unreasonable and without foundation. This case is, unequivocally, 
the epitome of a case that should have been presented to the jury for resolution, not the District 
Court. For these reasons, Mr. Henrie is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
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Based on the foregoing, Mr. Henrie respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
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